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The term disinformation is used extensively today in public discussions and also in a 
growing academic literature, but it has been subject to relatively little conceptual analysis—
although Søe (2018) helpfully reviews some philosophical treatments. More generally, the 
term’s range of meaning seems widely to be regarded as clear enough in its common uses 
that to dwell on fine points of definition would be needless, and perhaps 
counterproductively restrictive. However, this article is to show that anomalies encountered 
in the term’s use in practice reveal the need for more care in its conceptualization if it is to 
serve constructively in grasping what is at stake in public discussions. 
 
Certainly, a reasonably determinate field of concern is readily indicated by reference to a 
cluster of cognate ideas. Not uncommonly, the term ‘disinformation’ is used interchangeably 
with ‘misinformation’ or ‘propaganda’ and is assumed to refer to ‘false information’. It is 
generally understood to imply deception or misdirection of some form or to involve some 
kind of malign intent such as generating confusion. But while this broad family of ideas does 
capture aspects of a reasonably determinate field of inquiry, closer inspection of the different 
ideas reveals inconsistencies and even contradictions between their respective meanings. 
 
This article seeks to piece together a conceptualisation of disinformation which is 
recognizable as such to users of the term in practice but is rigorous and complete enough to 
account for anomalies that can arise from less fully examined assumptions about its 
meaning. This will involve a number of distinctions and clarifications that in some cases may 
not necessarily be familiar to all users of the term. 
 
Disinformation Cannot be Equated with Misinformation  
 
This first point is relatively widely accepted, notwithstanding the fact that the two terms are 
sometimes treated as equivalents even in research literature. For if they have the meanings 
that their common usages imply, they can and should be differentiated. 
 
The non-equivalence has several aspects. To begin with, if disinformation is taken to imply 
intent to deceive, as it generally is, then it cannot simply be equated with misinformation, if 
this is understood as information that happens to be false or misleading but can be imparted 
by mistake and without any intention to mislead. As pointed out by the ‘fact check’ 
organisation FullFact.org, for instance, misinformation can be identified and corrected using 
in principle straightforward empirical research methods; but to identify an intent to deceive 
is a much more difficult and potentially controversial undertaking (Hill 2020). Intent is 
regarded on this view as a subjective state that requires very different kinds of methods and 
skills to ascertain, if it can be reliably discerned at all. 
 
As well as this epistemological difficulty, another issue to note is that in implying an 
attribution of intent, the identification of disinformation also has an ethical valence: for 
intent to deceive is normally regarded as ethically reprehensible. Instances of it differ in this 
respect quite decisively from misinformation that arises from an innocent mistake. An 
innocent mistake involves an epistemic error but not an ethical failing. To refer to 







Staying for the moment with epistemic considerations, it has to be noted that the criteria for 
identifying instances of disinformation and of misinformation can be disjunctive. That is to 
say, although disinformation can sometimes involve the deliberate imparting of 
misinformation, and despite some users of the term defining it in these terms, it need not do 
so. As professional propagandists have long understood, a particularly effective method of 
persuading—and of deceiving if need be—is to hew as close as possible to the truth. 
Sometimes, being strategically ‘economical’ with the truth can create an intended deception 
without directly affirming any misinformation at all. 
 
The disjuncture, it might also be argued, can be confirmed by reference to the 
complementary possibility of deliberately communicating falsehood without intending to 
deceive—at least in any sense that would normally be deprecated or be regarded as a 
problem for academics or policy makers to occupy themselves with. Obvious illustrations of 
the point would feature pro-social lying: for example, stories about Santa Claus or the Tooth 
Fairy would not helpfully be described as disinformation campaigns.  
 
It is also possible to suppress truth as part of a strategic communication but without an 
intention to deceive in a malign way. A good illustration comes from Martin F. Herz (1949), 
in the earliest academic reference to disinformation I have so far found. Herz, who had 
honed propaganda techniques as Chief Leaflet Writer for Psychological Warfare at 
Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) during World 
War 2, recounts: 
 
Although it was true that prisoners in American P/W camps received eggs 
for breakfast, further testing [of prisoners’ reception of propaganda] showed 
us that this notion was so preposterous to the Germans on the other side of 
the firing line that they simply laughed at the idea. Since this discredited the 
balance of our message, it became another favorable truth which we learned 
to suppress (472). 
 
So there seems to be a possibility of deliberately but innocently communicating falsehoods 
or suppressing truths in a manner that would not seem to fit the more usual characterization 
of disinformation as something to be deprecated. Thus disinformation cannot necessarily be 
equated with misinformation and does not even need to involve misinformation.  
 
Meanwhile, the next point to clarify is whether disinformation might be equated with, or 
even clearly related to, information, as such, at all. 
 
Disinformation is not Information 
 
A proposition aired by the philosopher Duncan Pritchard (2021) is that ‘disinformation 
doesn’t seem to be a species of information’ (51). He does not expand on this particular 
thought, but there is a version of it that would disregard the distinction drawn in the 
previous section and would not categorise misinformation as a kind of information either. 
This is the thought that only true information is truly information, which is to assume an 
epistemically normative definition of information as a ‘success term’ (Gelfert 2018, 104). Yet, 






10 (7): 10-15. 2021. 
https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-609 
1983; Floridi 2011), its adoption for present purposes would impose an unhelpful and 
unnecessary constraint on formulating such simple practical questions as whether a given 
piece of information conveyed in a report is true or false.  
 
There is, however, a way of expounding the idea of disinformation such that it is not a 
species of information or of misinformation either. Disinformation can be thought of as not 
some bad sort of information, but as something ontologically distinct. The term can be 
understood as indicating a function of, or an effect that arises from, certain kinds of 
communicative practice—disinforming—that in some way subvert the meaning or value of 
true information, or else exploit misinformation. But if disinforming can be conceptualised 
as a function of certain kinds of communicative practice, so too can be informing and 
misinforming, and therefore the question would become that of how to differentiate these 
practices.  
 
Disinformation as a Function of Strategic Communication 
 
A potentially fruitful way suggested by Sille Obelitz Søe (2018) and Maria Samkova and Lilia 
Nefedova (2019) deploys the distinction drawn by the philosopher H.P. Grice (1975) 
between semantic and pragmatic meaning. Semantic meaning is captured in the propositional 
content of a piece of information whereas pragmatic intent can generate a distinct 
supervenient meaning that Grice calls implicature. The general idea of meaning something not 
literally stated in the words used when conveying it is very familiar, and Grice distinguishes 
two distinct sorts of way this can be done. 
 
Conventional implicature can convey an implied premise of a statement whose words are used 
with their conventional meaning. Grice’s example is the statement ‘He is an Englishman; he is, 
therefore, brave’: the conventional meaning of ‘therefore’ generates the implicature that all 
Englishmen are brave. Yet the speaker has not said this in so many words, and therefore has 
not actually made a claim that can be challenged as misinformation without initiating an 
inquiry into what the speaker intended to convey. The possibility that the statement could 
have been uttered ‘tongue in cheek’, for instance, illustrates a kind of implicature that does 
not derive simply from the words themselves. 
 
Conversational implicature, as Grice calls it, plays not on the semantic logic of statements but 
on the normative expectations of communication as it figures in conversation.  
 
Conversation, he points out, has its own immanent norms that people spontaneously 
acknowledge by participating in it as a general form of practice. These norms answer to what 
Grice calls the Cooperative Principle: it is this that makes a conversation out of what would 
otherwise be discrete and unrelated speech acts. He summarises these norms in terms of a 
cluster of maxims that participants in a conversation mutually expect each other to follow. 
His non-exhaustive list includes maxims under four broad categories: give sufficient but not 
excessive detail; be truthful; be relevant; be perspicuous. 
 
Now there are of course many ways of failing to fulfil a maxim that do not manifest any 






desultoriness, conflict, uncertainty, impetuosity, or shyness, for instance. More significantly, 
maxims can also be unfulfilled intentionally—as in the case of speaking ‘tongue in cheek’—
but not with intent to deceive. Grice’s illustration of a more purposive intent is the case of a 
professor who, in writing a student’s testimonial for a philosophy job, affirms that the 
student has an excellent command of English and has regularly attended tutorials. The 
absence of any comment on the student’s philosophical ability ‘speaks for itself’ as a 
recommendation not to hire the student. The professor knows that the counterpart will 
understand the failure to fulfil all the maxims as a communication in itself. However, 
implicature is also a versatile means of generating disinformation: in that event, the rules are 
not simply played with, in a spirit of complicity with the hearer; they are violated with intent 
to deceive. 
 
A question, therefore, is how a hearer can know, given the myriad ways in which infelicities 
might enter a conversation, whether a failure to follow the maxims is due to an intent to 
deceive. The key thought offered by Grice is that ‘[t]he presence of a conversational 
implicature must be capable of being worked out’ (Grice 1975, 50). If a hearer challenges a 
speaker’s implicature, then a conversational meta-norm, so to speak, would require the 
speaker to ‘translate’ the implicature into a semantically conventional form. In that form, the 
semantic content could be assessed as either information or misinformation. 
 
This general idea of a conversational meta-norm—which makes the Cooperative Principle 
itself something people generally are ready to follow—is what Jürgen Habermas, for 
instance, explicates in his theories of communicative action and discourse ethics. His basic 
idea of communicative action refers to what speakers are doing when they deliberate 
collaboratively with a view to reaching mutual understanding; communicative action carries 
an implicit commitment to offer hearers reasons for unclear or surprising claims. By 
contrast, it is possible to use speech to engage in strategic action: in this case, individual 
speakers aim to achieve their distinct particular objectives rather than reach an agreed 
understanding or clarification of residual disagreement: hence, if they participate in 
communication strategically, they may be prepared to violate norms such as Grice’s 
conversational maxims if necessary. In practice, of course, strategic elements may often 
figure in conversation without any intent to seriously mislead, and without doing so, but, in 
principle, the distinction itself is clear enough. 
 
What Habermas calls communicative action is a highly normative concept, invoking a quite 
idealised notion of communication compared to the more general variety of everyday 
understandings of that term. So for the sake of clarity, I shall instead use the term deliberative 
communication to refer to communication oriented to reaching an understanding through 
communicators reasoning together. Deliberative communication, then, contrasts quite 
decisively with the particular kinds of strategic action that are called strategic communication. 
 
The practice of disinforming uses implicature in a strategic manner. It depends on others 
relying upon general observance of the Cooperative Principle while the communicator of 
disinformation defects from doing so whenever this promotes the strategic objective. Insofar 
as a disinformant’s aim is to influence people towards some belief or cognitive commitment, 
this relies on the communicative norms of conversation by means of which other minds are 
engaged. But insofar as the intent is disinformative, the Cooperative Principle will be 
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Conversational implicature is such a pervasive and important aspect of communication that 
we can regard it as having its own normative status—as a rule-bound practice of playing with 
the rules of conversation. Disinformation, then, can be conceptualised as not playing the 
game by the rules due to the misuse of conversational implicature. For this reason, 
disinformation can in principle be identified by questioning the communicator. Where there 
is the possibility of challenging communicators to translate their claims into straightforward 
propositional form, it requires them to explicate their own intent. 
 
On the Limits of Purely Conceptual Analysis 
 
But all this applies within the context of an ordinary conversation between individuals. In 
that context, it can arise quite straightforwardly that a hearer asks a speaker to clarify a 
puzzling remark. Disinformation as a problem of public concern, however, arises in a quite 
different kind of situation. A similar conceptual logic holds, but the practical and contextual 
differences are important. If accusations of engaging in ‘disinformation’ are rare in ordinary 
conversation, this is because they would be regarded as confrontational and 
disproportionate: such an accusation would directly put the conversation on a different 
footing. It might be hyperbolic in that context to speak of this as a war footing, but 
disinformation such as is highlighted as a matter of public concern is quite characteristically 
regarded as a strategic element of information war.  
 
This points to a need, in the context of disinformation as a public concern, to further 
develop the conceptual framing in several ways. For one thing, the circumstances of a war 
involve mutually contending sides: so the model of a speaker being invited to clarify a 
problematic claim has to be expanded to accommodate typical scenarios where claims and 
challenges are reciprocal. Furthermore, if the opposition is between organised camps, as it 
typically will be, then the identification of who is speaking on behalf of them will not always 
be as clear as in a simple conversation. In all, the potential complexity of organised strategic 
communications is so considerable that adequately grasping any alleged instance of 
disinformation is likely to require a great deal of probing investigation.  
 
The claim of the present article is that although the conceptual analysis provided above is 
not sufficient to grasp fully the nature of the problem of disinformation as a public concern, 
it is necessary. For without the foregoing clarifications, any discussion of the problem is 
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